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HOME COURT ADVANTAGE: FLORIDA JOINS STATES
MANDATING DUE PROCESS IN NCAA PROCEEDINGS
TRAVIS L. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
F LORIDA'S colleges have enjoyed unparalleled success in intercol-
legiate athletics in recent years. These schools have displayed their
excellence in events sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation (NCAA). Schools such as Florida State University, the Uni-
versity of Florida, and the University of Miami join the NCAA
voluntarily, hoping to excel in big-time college athletics. In turn, the
schools subject themselves to the rules of the organization.' Critics of
the NCAA have argued that procedures for enforcing these rules are
unfair. Unfortunately, members have no real choice but to abide by
these rules and hope for internal reform because the NCAA has vir-
tual monopoly power over college athletics.' However, negative pub-
licity surrounding the NCAA's enforcement program has prompted a
number of reform movements designed to achieve increased fairness.
These reform movements are the basis for this Comment.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of the NCAA, an
overview of the enforcement process, and some of the complaints
most often raised about NCAA proceedings. Part III discusses the
role of the courts and Congress in the reform movement. Part IV de-
scribes the NCAA's efforts at internal reform and lists recommenda-
tions made by a special committee for enhancing the fairness of the
NCAA enforcement procedures. The NCAA has already adopted
some of these measures, while others will be on the agenda at upcom-
ing NCAA conventions.
Dissatisfied with both congressional inaction and NCAA foot-drag-
ging, several states have considered legislation requiring due process in
* The author would like to thank Charles Dudley for his assistance in accumulating mate-
rials for this project.
I. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Nev. 1992).
2. See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 422 F. Supp. 1158
(D. Minn. 1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); David F.
Gaona, The National Collegiate Athletic Association: Fundamental Fairness and the Enforce-
ment Program, 23 Am. L. REv. 1065, 1082 (1981).
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the NCAA enforcement program. Four states-Florida, Illinois, Nev-
ada, and Nebraska-actually have passed such measures. Part V fo-
cuses on Florida's Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance
Enforcement Procedures Act3 and discusses a recent federal case hold-
ing a similar Nevada statute unconstitutional. The Comment con-
cludes by acknowledging the NCAA's recent efforts to reform from
within, efforts I believe are motivated in part by the threat of legisla-
tion from Congress and from states such as Florida.
II. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssocIATION
A. History of the Organization
In the early 1900s, football was a dangerous game, causing the
death of at least eighteen student-athletes in 1905 alone.4 Unfortu-
nately, the money earned by the sport's top programs kept presidents
of those schools from seeking reform, despite the request of President
Theodore Roosevelt.' However, more open-minded presidents of less
influential schools saw the need for safety and passed a resolution
stating their intent to reform college football. 6 These presidents
formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States
(IAAUS), which adopted rules making football both safer and more
exciting. 7 The success of these changes ensured the authority of the
IAAUS, which later became the NCAA.
Despite the early success, the NCAA played only a minor role in
college athletics until after World War 11.8 For example, the NCAA
lacked the means to prevent schools from offering illegal inducements
to players.9 Gradually, however, under the leadership of Walter Byers,
the NCAA began increasing the dependence of schools on NCAA
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 240.5339-.5349 (1991).
4. DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE NCAA's INJUSTICE FOR ALL 3 (1991). Yaeger pro-
vides a well-researched account of problems within the NCAA. The book discusses not only
these problems, but also reveals the impact of NCAA actions on individuals involved. Former
United States Representative Tom McMillen praises the book as "the best source I have found
for [the NCAA's] abuses," and states that "Mr. Yaeger's research clearly documents the extent
of these problems." Letter from Tom McMillen, Representative, United States House of Repre-
sentatives, to Wint Winter, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee, Kansas State Senate 1 (Mar. 18,
1991) (including the testimony of Representative McMillen, Dem., N.Y., before the Judiciary
Committee of the Kansas Senate) (on file with author).
5. YAEoER, supra note 4, at 5.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5-6.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
NCAA
membership while at the same time creating enforcement provisions."
Today, an institution must be a member of the NCAA to participate
in NCAA-sponsored activities, 1' including the lucrative NCAA basket-
ball tournament. In effect, a school seeking to field a successful ath-
letic program must belong to the NCAA. 12 In turn, the school must
abide by the rules of the NCAA, 3 rules which have become more
complicated as the importance of college athletics has increased. 14 This
complexity has triggered problems among the NCAA, member institu-
tions and their staffs, and athletes.
B. The NCAA 's Enforcement Program
A brief look at the enforcement program of the NCAA will add
meaning to the discussion in later sections of this Comment. The
NCAA is a voluntary association composed of more than 1000 mem-
bers. 16 At annual NCAA conventions, these members determine the
policies and rules that govern many aspects of collegiate athletics. By
joining the NCAA, the member institution agrees to abide by the rules
of the organization. 7 Further, the institution's staff and student-ath-
letes are governed by these rules. 1 Thereafter, a member institution is
subject to the enforcement procedures of the NCAA when it does not
follow the rules of the organization. 9
10. Id. at 9-16.
11. Gaona, supra note 2, at 1070.
12. See supra note 2.
13. NATIONAL COLLE iATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 1989-90 MANUAL § 1.3.2 (1989).
14. Louisiana State University basketball coach Dale Brown is among those calling for sim-
plicity in the NCAA rules. Brown states, "It]he NCAA has a 479-page book with rule after rule
after rule. Every page is confusing." Dale Brown, Sorry, Congress: Laws Won't Cure What Ails
College Sports, SPORTNo NEWS, July 1, 1991, at 5. Brown adds that attorneys require several
minutes to interpret some rules, which leaves athletes and coaches helpless in finding their mean-
ing. Id. He states that the NCAA needs to promulgate "simple rules that everyone can under-
stand and follow." Id.
15. This section discusses the major areas of the NCAA investigatory process. The informa-
tion is drawn primarily from National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Miller, 795 F. Supp.
1476 (D. Nev. 1992). This case provides an excellent overview of the process. For further discus-
sion of the enforcement program, see Burton F. Brody, NCAA Rules and their Enforcement:
Not Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child-Rather Switch the Values and Spare the Sport, 1982
ARIz. ST. L.J. 109; Gaona, supra note 2; David K. Miller, The Enforcement Procedures of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association: An Abuse of the Student-Athlete's Right to Reasona-
ble Discovery, 1982 Asuz. ST. L.J. 133 (1982); John P. Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process
Protection: What's Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian,
_ U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988), 21 ARiz. ST. L.J. 621 (1989).
16. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1479.
17. Id. (citing NCAA CONST. art. 2.5.1).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1479-80 (citing NCAA CONST. art. 1.3.2).
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The NCAA Committee on Infractions supervises the enforcement
program. 20 Its duties include supervising an investigative staff,2" mak-
ing factual determinations, and imposing penalties.2 2 The NCAA also
encourages member institutions to conduct their own investigations
and to report potential violations. Upon receiving information sug-
gesting a potential rule violation, the enforcement staff may issue a
preliminary inquiry. The NCAA then conducts a review to determine
if an official inquiry is warranted. 2 The institution conducts its own
review and reports its findings to the Committee on Infractions, after
which the institution, the affected individuals, and the NCAA staff
attend a prehearing conference.Y At the conference, the NCAA staff
tells the parties what information it intends to use, and the parties
may review information about the alleged infraction before the offi-
cial inquiry. 2
The institution and the affected parties are allowed to attend the
hearing before the Committee on Infractions, where the parties may
present information and contest allegations. 26 However, the NCAA
cannot compel witnesses to appear or to testify. 7 After the presenta-
tions are complete, the Committee on Infractions deliberates pri-
vately, issues written findings, and recommends disciplinary action.28
Any disciplinary action is taken against the member institution be-
cause the NCAA cannot punish representatives or athletes directly.2 9
The affected parties formerly appealed to the NCAA Council, and ul-
timately to the full membership of the NCAA.30
20. Id. at 1480'. For an analysis of due process notions as they apply to the NCAA, see
Robin J. Green, Comment, Is the NCAA Playing Fair?: An Analysis of NCAA Enforcement
Regulations, 42 DuKE L.J. 99, 106-13 (1992). Green states that the NCAA employs most, but
not all, traditional due process concepts, and concludes that the organization's internal reform
makes state and federal legislation unnecessary. Id.
21. Notice that the body responsible for overseeing the enforcement program and making
factual determinations supervises the investigatory staff.
22. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (D. Nev. 1992).
See also Green, supra note 20, at 126.
23. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1480.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The NCAA Council is an administrative body elected at annual conventions. Hear-
ing appeals is just one of the Council's functions. The importance of this appeals process is
questionable because in the 40 years of the enforcement program, the NCAA Council has never
reversed a major penalty. FLA. Laois., JusTcE IN THE NCAA: GoILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT,
A BACKGROUNDER 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter JuscE rN THE NCAA]. However, at the 1993 NCAA
Convention, members voted overwhelmingly to establish an Infractions Appeals Committee as
the appellate body to which major findings of the Committee on Infractions are appealed. Con-
vention Voting Summary, NCAA NEws, Jan. 20, 1993, at 10, 14.
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C. Perceived Problems Within the NCAA
Complaints about the NCAA are not new. Congress conducted
hearings about the NCAA's enforcement process in 1978. 31 Courts
have also heard numerous complaints about the NCAA since the early
1970s.11 Fortunately, the NCAA has responded to some of the pres-
sure by upgrading the fairness of its process.33 However, the NCAA
must continue to improve to satisfy the public's concern. A brief re-
view of some of the complaints against the NCAA will help set the
background and provide insight as to which aspects of the process
state legislatures are trying to correct. 34
Several complaints arise frequently among the NCAA's critics.
First, detractors complain that those undergoing investigation are not
allowed to face their accusers.35 Second, until recently, interviews con-
ducted by NCAA staff were not tape-recorded, leaving a record con-
sisting of only handwritten notes and after-the-fact recollection. 6
Third, persons giving a statement to the NCAA are not allowed to
keep a copy of their own statement.3 7 The turnover rate of NCAA
staff members is also very high, leading to disjointed investigations
and an incomplete, inaccurate record. 3 This turnover also leads to in-
adequate training for new staff members .39
31. See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 46-92 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 110-49 and accompanying text.
34. In the interest of conserving space, this Comment does not recount specific abuses com-
mitted by the NCAA. For such criticism, see YAEGER, supra note 4.
35. FLA. LEoIS., TEN TmNcs You SHouLD KNOW ABouT WHAT =E NCAA CALLS
"JUSTICE" I (n.d.) [hereinafter TEN TmNos]. The NCAA's primary response to this charge is
that it does not have subpoena power and therefore cannot force accusers to appear. The NCAA
can only require appearance by the representatives of the school and those accused of wrongdo-
ing if associated with an NCAA school. See Andrew Bagnato, Accusers Won't Have to Go to
Hearings: NCAA, Cm. Tala., Jan. 11, 1992, at C3. However, at the 1992 NCAA convention,
members voted down a possible solution by rejecting a proposal that would have increased the
NCAA's ability to force accusers to appear at infractions committee meetings. Id.
36. For example, the NCAA conducted a two-and-one-half-hour interview of Illinois ath-
lete Ervin Small. YAEGER, supra note 4, at 61-63. During the interview, NCAA investigators
took three pages of notes. Because the interview could not be recorded, Small's attorney took
notes on behalf of his client and ended up with 33 legal-size pages. The NCAA's report was a 13-
page document written from the three pages of notes. Upon review, Small's attorney found the
report to be replete with distortions and false statements. Id. The NCAA has since relaxed its
stance on tape recording proceedings. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. However, par-
ties may not "make a copy of the tape or a verbatim transcript of the hearing." Green, supra
note 20, at 128.
37. TEN TInNos, supra note 35. In University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159, 1161
(Nev. 1979), the court stated that "[a] tape recording of the proceedings was made by the
NCAA, but no other recording was allowed, and the tape was not made available for later tran-
scription by the NCAA, although university attorneys were allowed to travel to [NCAA head-
quarters in] Kansas City to listen to it." (emphasis added).
38. TEN TmNos, supra note 35.
39. Id.
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Perhaps the biggest complaint about the NCAA is the close working
relationship of the investigatory staff with the Committee on Infrac-
tions, which makes factual determinations and imposes sanctions. 40
This collaboration has led many to accuse the NCAA of a guilty-until-
proven-innocent mentality. 41 Further, the athletes committing the viol-
ations often escape punishment, sometimes by striking deals for im-
munity with the NCAA.42 The NCAA may then sanction the member
school, affecting athletes who had nothing to do with the infraction,
while the athlete receiving immunity suffers no punishment.
In the discovery process, the NCAA requires institutions to cooper-
ate fully and to provide all relevant information. 43 However, the
NCAA has not been as willing to provide adequate information to the
institution. From the NCAA's point of view, these proceedings are
efficient because the NCAA enjoys a 10007o conviction rate, and no
one has ever won an appeal with the NCAA Council. 4 The unbal-
anced duties of the organization and its member schools have resulted
in the NCAA's being forced to spend millions of dollars each year
defending a process that it says is already fair. 45
III. THE RATIONALE FOR STATE LEGISLATION
A. The Court System: All Talk and No State Action
Cases challenging the fairness of NCAA enforcement procedures
usually involve charges that the organization has violated either the
Fourteenth Amendment6 or a constitutional right protected by 42
40. Id. This provides the NCAA with an inherent advantage and has been compared to
allowing collaboration between the prosecution and the judge hearing a case. Id.
41. JUSTICE IN THME NCAA, supra note 30.
42. See YAEOER, supra note 4, at 141-50. The power to grant immunity for providing infor-
mation is important because the NCAA lacks subpoena power. As a tool for uncovering infor-
mation, immunity power can be more valuable than subpoena power. Id. at 149.
43. Sahl, supra note 15, at 630 (citing NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 1989-90
NCAA MAsNUAL § 19.01.2 (1989)).
44. TEN TmNGs, supra note 35.
45. JusTIcE m, THE NCAA, supra note 30. The NCAA spends more than $1.5 million a year
in legal fees. This is nearly the amount the organization spends on its entire enforcement process.
YA. GR, supra note 4. at 159.
46. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1. In a suit against the NCAA, note that the individual must establish a liberty or property
interest in intercollegiate athletics. Note also that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
state conduct.
NCAA
U.S.C. section 1983.47 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the
"under color of law" requirement of section 1983 "has consistently
been treated as the same thing as the state action requirement under
the Fourteenth Amendment.' ' Under both provisions, only state con-
duct is prohibited; the statute generally does not reach private con-
duct, "however discriminatory or wrongful" it may be. 49 Thus, due
process challenges against the NCAA revolve around whether the
NCAA is properly classified as a state actor.3 0 A finding that the
NCAA is not a state actor eliminates the ability of athletes and institu-
tions to recover under a claim that their right to due process has been
abridged. However, a court could find that the NCAA is a state actor
and reach the constitutional claims on the merits. Even then, the court
could still find against the athlete or institution by finding that due
process was not denied.
In early cases against the NCAA, courts reached the due process
claims on the merits, but generally upheld the NCAA regulations."'
Courts indicated a uniform unwillingness to interfere in the internal
matters of a private association unless the association acted arbitrarily
or in a discriminatory manner . 2 For example, in Parish v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association," the court acknowledged that virtu-
47. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
48. Hawkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 652 F. Supp. 602, 606 (C.D, Ill. 1987)
(citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)).
49. Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)).
50. This Comment does not fully discuss legal actions brought against the NCAA. Rather,
the Comment provides background so the reader can see why state legislators have been forced
to address the problems of the NCAA. For additional discussion of the relationship between the
NCAA and the judiciary, see id. at 602; William T. McLain, NCAA Actions Do Not Constitute
State Action for Federal Constitutional Purposes: NCAA v. Tarkanian, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct.
454, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1988), 20 Tax. TEC L. REv. 1345 (1989).
51. See generally Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), abrogated by National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988);
Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975), abrogated by Mc-
Cormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (5th Cir. 1988) and National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gillard, 352 So.
2d 1072 (Miss. 1977).
52. See Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 So. 2d 912
(La. App. 1973); Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072; but see Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. National Colle-
giate Athletic Ass'n, 422 F. Supp. 1158 (1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed.
434 U.S. 978 (1977).
53. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ally every previous federal court decision discussing the issue had
found the NCAA to be a state actor.3 4 In accepting this classification,
the court stated that members of state-supported institutions play a
substantial role in the NCAA.1Y The court also found that the federal
and state governments have a "traditional interest in all aspects of this
country's educational system. '" 6 The court then stated that the NCAA
performs a traditional governmental function by regulating college
athletics.17 Nonetheless, the court upheld the NCAA's regulation un-
der a lenient "minimum rationality" standard." The court further re-
jected the due process challenge, stating that the appellants had not
been denied any liberty or property interest through the enforcement
of the NCAA regulation. 9
The court in Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association" agreed that the actions of the NCAA constitute state ac-
tion. In Howard the court noted that about fifty percent of the insti-
tutions in the NCAA are state- or federally-supported. 61 The court
referred to previous Supreme Court cases finding that private conduct
may become so impregnated with governmental characteristics as to
be considered that of a state actor. 62 The court bolstered its argument
by stating that state action may be found even where the government's
participation is indirect or one of several contributing forces to a con-
stitutional violation. 63 However, the court rejected Howard's due
process claim, finding that the NCAA had complied with any due
process requirement it might have had." Thus, courts had little trou-
ble characterizing the NCAA as a state actor in early cases, but when
reaching the merits of due process claims, they often deferred to the
54. Id. at 1031-32. McDonald v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 370 F. Supp. 625
(C.D. Cal. 1974), was the only exception noted by the court.
55. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1032-33. In support of this claim, the court stated that "were the NCAA to disap-
pear tomorrow, government would soon step in to fill the void." Id. at 1033. The court also
found classifying the NCAA as a state actor to be logical, stating that "it would be strange
doctrine indeed to hold that the states could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the
Constitution by banding together to form or to support a 'private' organization to which they
have relinquished some portion of their governmental power." Id.
58. Id. at 1034.
59. Id. The court, citing Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 430 F.2d
1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970), stated that "[t]he privilege of participating in interscholastic athletics
must be deemed to fall ... outside the protection of due process." Id.
60. 510 F.2d 213, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 214.
62. Id. at 217 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
63. Id. (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966)).
64. Id. at 222. The court also had substantial doubts about whether the university or the
athlete had a property interest subject to due process protection. Id.
NCAA
NCAA regulations or found that no protected liberty or property in-
terest existed.
After these early cases, the trend became to find that the actions of
the NCAA did not constitute state action. This trend culminated in a
U.S. Supreme Court decision that directly addressed the question of
whether the NCAA was a state actor.6 5 The earlier cases characterizing
the NCAA as a state actor had been based upon "the notion that indi-
rect involvement of state governments could convert what otherwise
would be considered private conduct into state action." 66 However,
the Supreme Court eliminated that possibility for finding state action
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,67 which freed states of liability for indepen-
dently-made school decisions, and Blum v. Yaretsky, which declared
that state permission for private action did not constitute state sanc-
tion. 61 These cases are generally recognized as the origin of a more
restricted view of state action.
In Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the court
applied these decisions to the NCAA and found the NCAA was not a
state actor.69 The court found that the regulation of intercollegiate
athletics "is not a function 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the
state.' ' 70 Like earlier courts, the Arlosoroff court recognized that
public institutions comprise one-half of the NCAA's membership and
provide more than half of the NCAA's revenues. 7' However, the court
found that this does not alter the status of the NCAA as a voluntary
association of public and private institutions. 72 Thus, according to Ar-
losoroff, to establish NCAA action as state action, the NCAA must
either be serving a traditional, exclusive governmental function or the
state must control or direct the NCAA's action. 73
The Supreme Court resolved all doubt about the proper classifica-
tion of the NCAA in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tar-
kanian.74 Tarkanian was the result of a long battle between the NCAA
and former University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV) coach Jerry Tar-
65. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
66. Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1985).
67. 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (state regulation of school and school's receipt of public funds not
enough to hold state responsible for decision of school).
68. 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (mere acquiescence to the actions of a private party not sufficient to
hold the state responsible).
69. 746 F.2d at 1022.
70. Id. at 1021 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1975)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1021-22. This requirement for state action was later summarized in Graham v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986).
74. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
19931
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kanian, college basketball's winningest coach. 7 The Supreme Court of
Nevada had previously found that the NCAA was a state actor by
distinguishing the Arlosoroff line of cases. 76 That court said the right
to discipline an employee of a public institution is traditionally exclu-
sively reserved to the states. 7 Thus, the Nevada court found that
UNLV's action of dismissing Tarkanian at the "request" of the
NCAA justified a finding of state action. 7 The court further found
that Tarkanian's contract with UNLV created a property interest that
was altered by the actions of UNLV and the NCAA. 79 After a discus-
sion of the inadequacies of the NCAA's investigation of UNLV and
Tarkanian, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the lower court's fa-
vorable ruling for Tarkanian.80
Finding that the NCAA was not a state actor, 81 the Supreme Court
reversed the Nevada court.12 The Court stated that although the
NCAA influenced UNLV's conduct,83 the University was the entity
that actually suspended Tarkanian.Y The Court stated that UNLV was
clearly a state actor, but separately determined "whether UNLV's ac-
tions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action." 5 The Court answered
this question negatively, stating that the source of the NCAA legisla-
tion prompting UNLV's actions was the collective membership of the
NCAA, independent of the influence of any particular state. 6 These
rules, according to the Court, did not become "state rules" because at
75. The problems among UNLV, Tarkanian, and the NCAA began in 1972 when the
NCAA initiated a preliminary inquiry into alleged violations by UNLV. Throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, the relationship between Tarkanian and the NCAA became the most adversarial in
NCAA investigation history. Tarkanian arose as a challenge to the NCAA demand that UNLV
fire Tarkanian. See generally YAEGER, supra note 4, at 195-248.
76. Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), cert.
granted in part, 484 U.S. 1058, rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
77. Id. at 1348.
78. Id. at 1349. The court stated that "both UNLV and the NCAA must be considered state
actors. By delegating authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by imposing
the NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the NCAA." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1353.
81. Several commentators have argued that Tarkanian was wrongly decided. See, e.g.,
Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. R~v. 137, 188-98 (1989); McLain, supra note 50; Sahl, supra note
15.
82. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
83. In reality, the NCAA did more than "influence" UNLV. Schools having no real alter-
native to NCAA membership are essentially forced to follow the NCAA's commands. See Sahl,
supra note 15.
84. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193.
85. Id.
86. Id.
NCAA
any time during the process UNLV could have withdrawn from the
NCAA. 3 Alternatively, the Court suggested that UNLV could have
worked for change within the internal processes of the NCAA 5
Therefore, by holding that the NCAA did not become a state actor by
influencing state action, the Supreme Court essentially eliminated the
court system-absent independent state law-as a method of review-
ing allegations that NCAA enforcement process are unfair.
The court system is also closed to athletes seeking to recover dam-
ages from penalties imposed by the NCAA. The schools, not the ath-
letes, belong to the NCAA. Thus, athletes have no direct influence in
the organization. In May 1992 this problem surfaced when a New
York trial court declared that Syracuse University basketball player
Conrad McRae could not sue the NCAA. a9 The court stated that the
NCAA had a relationship with Syracuse University but not with
McRae. 90 Therefore, the court found that McRae could not sue be-
cause the NCAA owed him no duty.9' The court reiterated the long-
standing tradition of having NCAA disputes resolved within the or-
ganization and not in the court system. 92
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the NCAA is not a state
actor, eliminating the ability of schools, their personnel, and athletes
to enjoin the NCAA from using unfair procedures. With the decision
in the McRae case, the court system has also precluded athletes from
suing for damages suffered as a result of those procedures. If the deci-
sion in the McRae case stands on appeal, the court system appears to
be a closed circle, providing no relief to the athletes for whom the
NCAA was created in the first place.
B. Congress: All Talk and No Action
Complaints about the NCAA's investigation and enforcement pro-
cedures have not gone unnoticed by Congress. 93 Since 1978, some
87. Id. at 194-95. See supra note 80. This is a narrow view and does not take into account
the pressures facing today's athletic programs. However, the Court is unsympathetic to reality,
stating that just because "UNLV's actions were unpalatable does not mean that they were non-
existent." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 n. 19 (1988).
88. Id. at 195. This method probably would not have benefitted UNLV because the influ-
ence of any one school is very small. Further, complaints of schools that have been investigated
are often viewed as just sour grapes.
89. Court Rules Syracuse's McRae Can't Sue NCAA, TAMPA T~aB., May 14, 1992, at
Sports 6. McRae sued the NCAA for $1.35 million for alleged damages for mental anguish
resulting from a four-game suspension in the 1991-92 season. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Investigations by Congress date back to 1978. In that time, other authors have ad-
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members of Congress have kept a watchful eye on the NCAA.94 In
1978 a congressional subcommittee heard testimony and reviewed the
NCAA enforcement programs. 95 The subcommittee suggested that
"the NCAA revise and completely recodify its substantive rules with
an eye to simplicity and clarity." 96 The subcommittee also recom-
mended eighteen changes for the NCAA's enforcement process.91 The
dressed the hearings in more detail than will appear here. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 15;
Gaona, supra note 2; Brian L. Porto, Balancing Due Process and Academic Integrity in Intercol-
legiate Athletics: The Scholarship Athlete's Limited Property Interest in Eligibility, 62 IND. L.J.
1151 (1987).
94. For an article suggesting that the only meaningful change in NCAA procedures results
from legislative, not judicial, review, see Russell W. Szwabowski, Note, The Federal Courts
Have Given the NCAA Back Its Home Court Advantage, 67 U. DET. L. REv. 29, 80-94 (1989).
95. NCAA Enforcement Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1978) [hereinafter NCAA Hearings].
96. Porto, supra note 93, at 1172 (quoting STAFF OF THE SuBcoM,. ON OVERSIoHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N 54
(Comm. Print 1978)).
97. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETiC ASS'N, SUMMARY OF HOUSE SuBcOMMrrTEE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS IN 1978 AND NCAA RESPONSES THERETO I (n.d.) [hereinafter SUMMARY AND RESPON-
SES]. This summary listed the 18 recommendations of the majority, the views of the minority,
and NCAA action taken. The majority recommendations are:
1. Specify statute of limitations (minority agreed) (adopted by NCAA at 1979 Convention-
Bylaw 32.5.2);
2. Establish evidentiary standards (minority agreed) (adopted by NCAA at 1979 Convention-
Bylaws 32.6.5.5 and 32.6.6.2);
3. Liberalize "gag" rule on institutions in enforcement procedures (minority agreed in princi-
ple, but noted that no "gag" rule existed) (NCAA stated that no action was necessary to com-
ply);
4. Limit extent of Council review (minority agreed) (adopted by NCAA at 1984 Convention-
Bylaw 32.8.2);
5. Appoint staff clerk to Committee on Infractions (minority agreed) (no action taken by
NCAA. In 1990, one staff member assigned to provide support services);
6. Permit student-athletes access to enforcement hearing (minority agreed) (NCAA stated no
action necessary to comply);
7. Eliminate ex parte contacts with Committee on Infractions or Council (minority agreed)
(adopted by NCAA at 1979 Convention-Bylaws 32.5.1 and 32.6.6.1);
8. Provide transcript of hearing to institution (minority agreed in principle) (no actiofi taken
by NCAA because of concern over public identification of individuals involved);
9. Eliminate Committee on Infractions supervision of enforcement staff (minority agreed in
principle) (adopted by NCAA at 1979 Convention-Bylaw 32.5. 1);
10. Specify time limit between preliminary inquiry and official inquiry (minority agreed this
should come within a "reasonable time") (no action taken by the NCAA, which claims minority
position is consistent with NCAA rules-Bylaw 32.2.2.1.4);
11. Give self-incrimination and "right-to-counsel" warnings (minority disagreed, except to ex-
tent already required by NCAA procedures) (no action taken by NCAA);
12. Establish procedure for advance eligibility determinations (minority agreed in principle,
stated that the NCAA Council should study) (NCAA claims Eligibility Committee complied in
NCAA
subcommittee's minority agreed with eleven of these recommenda-
tions.98 Of these eleven recommendations, the NCAA immediately
adopted four and partially adopted another. 9 Additionally, the
NCAA claimed that three other recommendations were already en-
compassed by existing NCAA procedures.'00 Further, the NCAA reco-
dified its substantive rules in the late 1980s and created a list of
"major" and "minor" violations.' 0'
After the 1978 hearings, Congress took no significant action until
1991. During that time, with several highly publicized NCAA investi-
gations, the public continued to perceive NCAA proceedings as un-
fair. 10 2 Finally, in June 1991 a House subcommittee held hearings to
discuss various aspects of the NCAA, including the enforcement proc-
ess. 103 The hearings came at a time when U.S. Representative Ed
Towns of New York introduced legislation that would require the
NCAA to use due process during its investigations.' °4 Further, former
Representative Tom McMillen, a perpetual adversary of the NCAA,
introduced a measure that would bring major reforms to college ath-
letics. 105
early 1980s);
13. Permit participation by all former student-athletes and athletic representatives in Commit-
tee on Infractions proceedings (minority disagreed for most part) (NCAA disagreed, except as to
student-athletes, and has taken no action);
14. Hold joint and parallel investigation with institutional personnel (minority disagreed)
(NCAA disagreed and has taken no action, but permits flexibility if institution shows commit-
ment to investigation);
15. NCAA, rather than institution, make ineligibility declarations (minority disagreed)
(NCAA disagreed and has taken no action);
16. Revise and recodify substantive rules (minority disagreed) (NCAA originally disagreed, but
recodified 1989-90 Manual);
17. Establish schedule of major/minor offenses (minority disagreed) (adopted by NCAA at
1983 Special Convention-Bylaws 19.3 and 19.4);
18. Appoint "blue ribbon" commission to study the enforcement program (minority disa-
greed) (no action taken by NCAA until Special Committee to Review the Enforcement and In-
fractions Process appointed in 1991); see infra notes 124-49 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of the effect of legislative review on NCAA regulations, see Szwabowski, su-
pra note 94.
98. SUMMARY AND RESPONSES, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Letter from Richard Schultz, Executive Director, NCAA, to Cardiss Collins, Chair,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness 1 (July 12, 1991) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Collins].
102. See generally Ed Sherman, NCAA: Reality vs. Perception: Schultz Decries Image Prob-
lems as Reform Continues, Cm. TRm., Jan. 8, 1992, at C3.
103. See Steve Wieberg, Congress Takes Look at NCAA, USA TODAY, June 12, 1991, at Cl.
104. Robert Sullivan, Watch Out, NCAA; Alarmed Politicians are Eyeing College Sports,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 1, 1991, at 9. Such legislation would be similar to state legislation
discussed infra notes 174-263 and accompanying text.
105. Ed Sherman, NCAA Hopes to Avoid Government 'Intrusion', Cm. Tram., Aug. 4,
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This revival of congressional interest' °6 reveals that some of those
interested in college athletics believe that the NCAA has not made
enough progress since the swift kick of the 1978 hearings.10 7 Mc-
Millen, for example, doubts that the bureaucracy of the NCAA will
allow it to achieve significant change.10s However, some believe that
the very threat of congressional involvement may force the NCAA to
take action. Jim Delany, Commissioner of the Big Ten Conference,
has said Congress "can serve as a catalyst .... Sometimes outside
pressure can bring about internal change."' 9 Congressional interest
has been instrumental in forcing the NCAA to review its own policies.
Nonetheless, a federal law requiring the NCAA to use due process has
not been passed and does not appear imminent.
IV. INTERNAL REFORM WITHIN THE NCAA
As discussed earlier, the NCAA took action after the 1978 congres-
sional subcommittee hearings."10 According to the NCAA, all but one
of the joint recommendations of the majority and minority of the sub-
committee have been adopted."' For example, the subcommittee rec-
ommended that the NCAA provide a transcript of hearings to the
institution."t 2 The NCAA decided not to take action on that recom-
mendation to maintain the confidentiality of information disclosed at
1991, at Cl. Representative McMillen's proposal included more than just due process provisions.
His plan also covered negotiation of television contracts and would have established a presiden-
tial panel to make rules and regulations. Id.
106. Some authorities believe that congressional involvement is the best way to correct
wrongs within the NCAA. In addition to McMillen, Coach Jerry Tarkanian has long lobbied for
congressional action. See generally Kelly Carter, LSU's Brown Breaks Ranks on Due Process,
SpoRTiNo Naws, July 1, 1991, at 42. Further, U.S. District Judge Howard McKibben stated that
Congress, not the states, should address NCAA problems. Briefs, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1992, at
C3. However, some authorities, including Louisiana State University basketball coach Dale
Brown and the Knight Commission (a private panel commissioned to study intercollegiate athlet-
ics), think that Congress should stand aside and let the NCAA reform itself. See generally
Carter, supra; Jim Myers, Knight Panel Urges Support for Presidents, USA TODAY, Mar. 18,
1992, at C9. Nonetheless, the threat of congressional action, even without legislation, provides
an incentive for the NCAA to review its own procedures. See infra text accompanying note 109.
107. Sullivan, supra note 104. Duke law professor John C. Weistart asserts that recent con-
gressional activity was triggered by the inaction of the NCAA. Id. Weistart states that "[t]he
beast [big-time college sports] is unwilling to kill itself, so federal involvement is coming." Id.
108. Sherman, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. See SuMMARY ANo RESPONSES, supra note 97.
111. Id. Note that the majority and minority concurred in only II of the 18 recommenda-
tions. Id.
112. Id.
NCAA
hearings." 3 The adoption of other recommendations has taken place
over the years following the subcommittee's recommendations. This
includes the significant reform undertaken in 1985." Thus, NCAA
Executive Director Richard Schultz stated that "[tjo suggest that...
the program has been static since 1978 would be simply to ignore the
record."' 1 5 Recognizing, however, that phasing in 1978 recommenda-
tions over a ten-year period was not enough to appease the critics,
Schultz stated at the 1991 NCAA Convention that the NCAA should
again review its investigative process." 6 Schultz's words obviously had
an effect because the 1991 convention overwhelmingly passed land-
mark reform legislation.' 17 Later in 1991, the Knight Commission, a
private group commissioned to study the condition of intercollegiate
athletics, suggested further reforms that the NCAA will consider over
the next five years."' The Knight Commission stated several times in
its report that if the institutions do not take control of their athletic
programs, Congress will step in. l9
The NCAA responds that laws from Congress or the states requir-
ing due process are not necessary because the organization's policies
already provide due process. 20 The NCAA further contends that it
cannot provide the same rights to athletes as those granted in a crimi-
nal proceeding because the NCAA lacks the power to subpoena wit-
nesses.'2 ' However, claiming that the system already provides due
113. Id. The NCAA believes that this confidentiality is essential to receiving information in
the absence of subpoena power. Id.
114. The 1985 reforms included toughening enforcement policies and adding the "death pen-
alty," a prohibition against competing in one or more sports, for repeat violators. Danny Rob-
bins, NCAA Will Investigate Its Own Investigations, L.A. TEss, Jan. 8, 1991, at CI.
115. Letter to Collins, supra note 101.
116. Robbins, supra note 114. NCAA Executive Director Schultz suggested that allowing
investigators to record interviews is a possible way to improve. Id.
117. Hunter R. Rawlings, III, Why Did We Take So Long?: Reform, Says a College Presi-
dent, Was Overdue, SPORTS ILLUSTRATD, Jan. 21, 1991, at 72.
118. Mark Asher, Panel Asks NCAA for Reforms; Report Urges Colleges To Focus on De-
grees, Shft Coaches' Power, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at Al. The Knight Commission report
addressed many aspects of college athletics and generally calls for more control over the big
business of athletic programs. Id.
119. Id.
120. Schultz Defends NCAA's Legal Procedure, L.A. Thn4s, June 21, 1991, at C2. The Lee
Committee, discussed infra at text accompanying note 124, agrees with this assessment. The
Committee claims that, of the 10 due process guidelines in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), the NCAA's procedures already have seven. See infra note 126. Two of the remaining
procedures are allegedly outside of the authority of the NCAA, including the opportunity to
confront witnesses. The NCAA has also published a list of 28 due process considerations encom-
passed by the NCAA's procedures. NATONAL COLLEGIATE AnBnIac As'N, CURRENT DUE-
PRocEss COSDERATIO NS 1 (n.d.) (listing elements of the investigatory process that allegedly
embody due process).
121. Schultz Defends NCAA 's Legal Procedure, supra note 120. This is how the NCAA
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process satisfies neither those who have recently been through the
NCAA enforcement system nor the public. Accordingly, such claims
do not satisfy legislators. Southern Illinois University law professor C.
Peter Goplerud has noted the importance of the public, athletes,
coaches, and schools believing that the procedures are fair. 12 Gople-
rud acknowledged that the NCAA must act promptly if it expects to
keep state and federal legislatures from taking charge. 
12
The NCAA also recognized the need to hasten its reform process.
In mid-1991, the NCAA established a special committee, known as
the Lee Committee, to review the NCAA's enforcement procedures.
124
The chair of this Committee was Rex E. Lee, president of Brigham
Young University and former U.S. Solicitor General. Interestingly,
Lee was also an attorney for the NCAA in NCAA v. Tarkanian.121 He
served as chair of a committee designed to analyze the NCAA's en-
forcement process just three years after urging the U.S. Supreme
Court that the NCAA is not a state actor and should not be held to
constitutional due process standards at all.126
The NCAA directed the Lee Committee127 to "[clonduct a thorough
review of the enforcement and infractions process" and "to make
answers complaints that individuals are not able to face their accusers. However, the NCAA
recently defeated a measure that would have increased the chances for individuals to face those
making allegations. See supra note 35.
122. C. Peter Goplerud, Reform the NCAA Process, CHRISTL&N Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 1,
1991, at 19.
123. Id.
124. This also satisfied one of the recommendations of the 1978 House Subcommittee. See
SUMMARY AND RESPONSES, supra note 97.
125. 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1988).
126. See id. at 191-99. This led to concern that the NCAA had set itself up for some "home
cooking" by appointing Lee to the chair. Letter from Florida Representative James E. "Jim"
King, Jr., Repub., Jacksonville, to Richard Schultz, Executive Director, NCAA (Apr. 17, 1991)
(on file with author). Schultz addressed this concern by pointing out that Lee argued against the
NCAA in a 1984 television rights case. However, this left Representative King unsatisfied be-
cause representing the NCAA in a due process case is much more related to the purpose of the
Lee Committee than was the television rights case. Id. Nonetheless, Lee's appointment is an
interesting choice for an organization that is trying to quiet public concern over allegedly unfair
enforcement procedures. Other members of the Lee Committee were certainly qualified to serve
as chair and would have created less of an impression of bias. See infra note 127 (listing Com-
mittee members).
127. Members of the Lee Committee were Rex E. Lee, president of Brigham. Young Univer-
sity and former U.S. Solicitor General, chair; Reuben V. Anderson, former Mississippi Supreme
Court judge; Warren E. Burger, former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court; Ben-
jamin R. Civiletti, former Attorney General of the United States; Charles W. Ehrhardt, profes-
sor of law and faculty athletics representative at Florida State University; Becky R. French,
university counsel at North Carolina State University; Charles Renfrew, vice president, legal, of
Chevron Corporation, former U.S. district court judge, and former deputy U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral; Philip W. Tone, former U.S. district court judge and former U.S. appellate court judge;
Paul R. Verkuil, president of the College of William and Mary; and two members of the NCAA
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sure that the process is being handled in the most effective way, that
fair procedures are guaranteed, [and] that penalties are appropriate
and consistent." 8 The NCAA also asked the Lee Committee to "de-
termine if there can be innovative changes that will make the process
more positive and understandable to those involved and to the general
public.' '129
In October 1991 the Lee Committee completed its work by making
several findings and issuing eleven recommendations for consideration
by the NCAA. 130 Among the findings, the Committee acknowledged
the "quality and credibility of the efforts of both the Committee on
Infractions and the enforcement staff."'' The Committee also found
that the "Association has a consistent history of willingness to review
and adjust its enforcement and infractions procedures."'1 2 The Com-
mittee recognized that the NCAA is not bound by constitutional due
process standards, but noted that the organization should provide
procedural fairness protections in the interest of its members and in its
own interest.' Despite the admiration for current practices, the Com-
mittee also stated that current NCAA procedures could be improved
by adopting the Committee's recommendations.' 3 4 Some of these pro-
posals could be approved by the NCAA Council, while others would
Council, Charles Cavagnaro, director of athletics at Memphis State University, and William M.
Sangster, director of international programs and faculty athletics representative at Georgia Insti-
tute of Technology. SPECIAL COMM. TO REVIEW E NCAA ENFORCEMENT AND INFRACTIONS
PROCESS, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AW'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (Oct. 28,
1991) [hereinafter LEE REPORT].
128. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2-8.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The 11 recommendations of the Lee Committee are:
1. Enhance the adequacy of the initial notice of an impending investigation and assure a per-
sonal visit by the enforcement staff with the institution's chief executive officer;
2. Establish a "summary disposition" procedure for treating major violations at a reasonably
early stage in the investigation;
3. Liberalize the use of tape recordings and the availability of such recordings to involved
parties;
4. Use former judges or other eminent legal authorities as hearing officers in cases involving
major violations and not resolved in the summary disposition process;
5. Open hearings to the greatest extent possible;
6. Provide transcripts of all infractions hearings to appropriate involved parties;
7. Refine and enhance the role of the Committee on Infractions and establish a limited appel-
late process beyond that committee;
8. Adopt a formal conflict-of-interest policy;
9. Expand the public reporting of infractions cases;
10. Make available a compilation of previous committee decisions;
II. Study the structure and procedures of the enforcement staff.
Id. at 3-8.
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require a vote of the NCAA membership at its annual convention.'"
In January 1992 the NCAA Council approved several changes in
the enforcement procedures. 3 6 The enforcement staff will now pro-
vide enhanced preliminary notice of major rules violations to an insti-
tution's chief executive officer. 3 7 The Committee on Infractions will
also develop a process for "expedited hearings," enabling the enforce-
ment staff to propose earlier resolution of the case. 38 The NCAA will
liberalize the use of tape recordings and make the recordings available
at locations other than the NCAA's headquarters. 39 While maintain-
ing provisions for confidentiality, the NCAA will also make tran-
scripts of proceedings available to those with standing to appeal a
decision of the Committee on Infractions. 14° In addition, the Commit-
tee on Infractions will adopt a formal conflict-of-interest policy for
itself, its staff, and the enforcement staff. '4' The Chair of the Com-
mittee on Infractions will handle public announcements of committee
decisions. 142 Finally, upon approval of the NCAA Executive Commit-
tee, an independent staff will be hired to assist the Committee on In-
fractions in scheduling and conducting hearings, writing reports, and
handling public announcements. 41
NCAA Executive Director Schultz was pleased that the Council
adopted these recommendations, stating that taking prompt action
shows the Committee on Infractions' "sincere commitment to the
concept of due process by providing the fairest possible enforcement
procedures."'" However, the NCAA announced that using indepen-
dent hearing officers and establishing open hearings would require ac-
tion by the membership at a convention and could not be adopted by
Council approval. 45 The Council also did not adopt changes in the
appeals process because those changes also required approval at a
convention.'4 Schultz acknowledged that a poor image is hard to
135. The NCAA holds its conventions each January. Some of the recommendations of the
Lee Committee did not make the agenda for the 1992 Convention and were scheduled for con-
sideration in 1993.
136. NATIONAL COLLEOIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, PRESS RELEASE, NCAA Council Endorses
Changes in Enforcement Procedures (Jan. 11, 1992) [hereinafter PiLEss RELEASE].
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. NCAA headquarters are in Kansas City, Missouri.
140. d.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id. Letter from Samuel P. Bell, III, NCAA local counsel, to Florida Senator Fred R.
Dudley, Repub., Fort Myers (Jan. 16, 1992) (on file with author).
146. PRss RELEASE, supra note 136, at 2. The NCAA modified its appeals process at the
1993 Convention. See supra note 30.
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overcome, but stated that the public perception of the NCAA will im-
prove over the next two years as the public realizes that the NCAA
has changed. 147 Regarding the threat of federal and state legislation,
Schultz stated that the NCAA improvements "could go a long way
toward forestalling that, especially on the state level."
4 8
V. STATES REQUIRE DUE PROCESS IN NCAA PROCEEDINGS
A. States Mandate Due Process
Schultz' prediction that NCAA changes would forestall state legisla-
tion turned out to be incorrect because on June 1, 1992, Florida be-
came the fourth state to mandate due process in NCAA
proceedings. 4 9 Moreover, although only four states have enacted such
laws,150 several other state legislatures have recognized problems in the
NCAA enforcement process.' 5'
The response to such legislative efforts has been predictable. For
example, in speaking to Illinois' attempts to adopt due process re-
quirements for NCAA disciplinary proceedings Shultz claimed that
such laws are "meant to gut the enforcement process."' 5 2 Others ar-
gued that the proposed law was unconstitutional and that due process
legislation would harm the NCAA's ability to conduct business in the
states with such measures. 53 Further, the NCAA has threatened that
147. Sherman, supra note 102, at C3.
148. Jonathan Feigen, NCAA Proposal Falls Short; Conduct Code Fails to Get Enough
Votes, HOUSTON CHnRoN., Jan. 11, 1992, at Sports 6. At the 1992 NCAA Convention, the NCAA
Council and the enforcement staff supported a measure that would have allowed the infractions
panel to sanction individuals for "unethical conduct" for refusing to provide information in an
NCAA investigation. Id. This measure would have simulated subpoena power for individuals
within the organization. Although supported by three-fourths of the NCAA's Division I (largest,
most powerful) schools, the measure received a 64.4% affirmative vote, falling short of the two-
thirds vote needed from the general membership. Id.
149. FLA. STAT. §§ 240.5339-.5349 (1991).
150. Id.; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2901-2913 (Smith-Hurd 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
85-1201 to 1210 (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 398.155-.255 (Michie 1991).
151. States that have considered such laws include California, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
New York, and South Carolina. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, NCAA STATE LEGISLA-
TION DUE PROCESS COMPARISON (n.d.). A similar bill was also filed in Mississippi. Colleges,
WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1992, at C2.
152. Sports Notebook; Schultz: Feud to Land in Supreme Court, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 19,
1992, at Sports 8.
153. In response to the Illinois due process bill, for example, University of Illinois President
Stanley Ikenberry agreed that state bills would hinder the NCAA's investigatory process. How-
ever, Representative Timothy Johnson, chief sponsor of the Illinois law, countered by stating
that more states should pass due process measures to keep the NCAA from "foot-dragging" in
internal reform. Hugh Dellios, Edgar Signs Anti-NCAA Due Process Bill Into Law, CI. TRIB.,
Sept. 13, 1991, at C6.
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schools in states passing due process legislation run the risk of losing
NCAA membership.I14 Schultz stated that "it might be impossible for
that state's institutions to be a member of the NCAA because there
would be no way for them to comply with the rules."'35 Schultz fur-
ther noted that the legislation has surfaced in states with schools that
have been put on probation by the NCAA, 156 thereby implying that in
these states, a substantial element of revenge makes anti-NCAA legis-
lation politically popular. 1 7 Finally, Schultz claimed that upon telling
Illinois that its schools could lose NCAA membership, the Illinois
Legislature withdrew consideration of its bill. 5 Again, Schultz spoke
too soon, as Illinois later passed due process legislation. 59
Although Florida's Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance En-
forcement Procedures Act' 60 became effective on June 1, 1992, the
Act was originally scheduled to become effective one year earlier. In
the 1991 legislative session, the Senate Education Committee ap-
proved the legislation.' 61 However, after meeting with Schultz, the
Legislature delayed the effective date of the bill until June 1, 1992, to
give the NCAA time to make internal reforms. 162 The NCAA under-
took some reforms at its 1992 convention, thereafter claiming that
these reforms and the items to be considered at its 1993 convention
warranted a repeal or delay of the Act. 63 Florida's legislators were not
persuaded, leaving the Florida law to become effective in mid-1992.
However, the NCAA has stated that it will challenge the Florida law if
the opportunity arises.'"
Initial consideration of the NCAA due process issue arose in Flor-
ida in 1991 when the Postsecondary Education Planning Commission
(PEPC) reviewed collegiate athletic association procedures and poli-
cies. 65 PEPC recognized that individual state laws could be in con-
154. David Davidson, Politicians Take Aim at NCAA; States Concerned About Due Proc-
ess, ATLANTA CONSr., Apr. 30, 1991, at El.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. David Davidson, COLLEGE ATHLETICS; Schultz Warns States About Anti-NCAA
Laws, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 20, 1991, at E7. The counter-argument is that only states that have
been through an NCAA proceeding realize the unfairness of the process. YAEGER, supra note 4,
at 133.
158. Davidson, supra note 157.
159. Governor Jim Edgar signed the Illinois bill on September 12, 1991. Dellios, supra note
153.
160. FLA. STAT. §§ 240.5339-.5349 (1991).
161. FLA. S. COMM. ON EDUc., NCAA/S.B. 1248, Feb. 10, 1992 (brief statement on the
status of SB 1248).
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
164. Cynthia Barnett, NCAA Asks Lobbyist To Fight State Law, GAINESVILLE SUN, Nov. 24,
1991.
165. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Educ., SB 1104 (1991) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 10, 1991)
NCAA
flict, leading to inconsistent application of NCAA procedures
throughout the country.1 6 Therefore, PEPC suggested that the Flor-
ida Legislature pass a resolution calling for the NCAA to adopt due
process protections for member institutions. 67 However, believing
that a resolution would not have any impact, some lawmakers decided
to pursue legislation.'"1
Florida's due process law resulted from this pursuit. Although Flor-
ida's new law theoretically applies to any major collegiate athletic as-
sociation, 6 9 only the NCAA currently qualifies for regulation under
the Act.170 The NCAA has made significant attempts at internal re-
form. However, these efforts fall short of the due process protections
required by the Florida statute. Comparing the new law to existing
NCAA procedures and the recommendations of the Lee Committee
reveals the broad sweep of the Florida statute.
Beginning with the investigatory process, the Florida statute re-
quires the NCAA to provide notice to an interviewee once the NCAA
suspects the individual of violating its rules.' 7' Under current NCAA
practice, the interviewee is notified that an interview will be held to
determine whether the individual has been involved in a violation of
NCAA rules. Additional notice is given if ethical violations are sus-
pected. 72 The Lee Committee made no recommendation about the no-
tice given to individual interviewees. However, this is not surprising
because the Florida provision does not materially alter current prac-
tice.
Under the Florida statute, individuals in Florida are entitled to
counsel and to a complete recording and free transcript, prepared by a
court reporter, of the interview.'" The NCAA must inform the inter-
viewee of these rights and obtain a written acknowledgement. 74 The
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter "Staff Analy-
sis"). The Postsecondary Planning Commission is a subordinate of the Florida Department of
Education.
166. Id. (citing Postsec. Educ. Planning Comm'n, Fla. Dep't. of Educ., Due Process in In-
tercollegiate Athletic Association Policies and Procedures (Mar. 1991)).
167. Id.
168. Letter from Representative James E. "Jim" King, Jr., Repub., Jacksonville, to Senator
Fred R. Dudley, Repub., Fort Myers (Mar. 25, 1991) (on file with author).
169. Section 240.5340, Florida Statutes (1991), targets collegiate athletic regulatory associa-
tions that have at least 200 member institutions among 40 states. The organization must also
receive at least $2 million in revenues from broadcasts of sporting events. Id. Currently, the
NCAA is the only athletic association that meets these criteria.
170. Staff Analysis, supra note 165.
171. FLA. LEGis., COMPARATIVE "DuE PROCESS" PROTECTIONS 1 (Feb. 14, 1992) [hereinafter
PROTECTIONS].
172. Id.
173. FLA. STAT. § 240.5343(2) (1991).
174. Id.
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NCAA currently allows individuals to obtain counsel if the interview
may reveal information detrimental to the interviewee.175 In interviews
related to the institution, an institutional representative or legal coun-
sel must be present. 7 6 The NCAA does not provide a transcript, but
does allow recording of the interview with the consent of the inter-
viewee. 177 However, access to this tape is limited. The interviewee may
also take notes during the interview and may review and correct the
report of the interviewer. 78 The Lee Committee suggested that the
NCAA liberalize tape recording, explaining that a "persistent problem
[in NCAA proceedings] is the lack of access to evidence held by the
opposing side.' ' 79 The Committee suggested that in most cases this
could be remedied by tape recording statements from witnesses and
making these tapes "discoverable" by any person or institution hav-
ing an actual stake in the outcome of the case.8 0The Florida statute contains the additional provision that any infor-
mation obtained in violation of the Act may be suppressed by the in-
terviewee.' 81 Current NCAA provisions do not provide a right to
suppress information, but generally, information collected by imper-
missible means is not considered in NCAA hearings.' The Florida
statute has the advantage of providing a clearer standard for the use
of information.
Comparing prehearing procedures, a Florida interviewee has the
right to disclosure of all relevant facts to the same degree as a criminal
defendant.18 3 Under NCAA procedures, a prehearing conference is
held, during which the parties share and discuss the information upon
which the NCAA will rely.'8 The NCAA staff prepares a case sum-
mary before the hearing and identifies the allegations, as well as the
information and individuals on which the NCAA will rely; it then pro-
175. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. However, this may not be the benefit that it appears to be. Even the opportunity to
correct the report does not ensure that all errors and biases will be eliminated. See YAEGER,
supra note 4, at 66-69.
179. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 5.
180. Id. However, in cases in which the recorded information could be detrimental to the
institution or the investigation, the enforcement staff could request a protective order from the
hearing officer. Id.
181. FLA. STAT. § 240.5343(3) (1991).
182. But see YAEGER, supra note 4, at 213-14. In the UNLV case, the NCAA accepted hear-
say from NCAA investigators over UNLV's depositions, affidavits, receipts, and other docu-
ments. Id.
183. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(6) (1991).
184. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 2. Unfortunately, this conference has traditionally
been too close to the hearing to do the respondent any good. See YAGER, supra note 4, at 131-
32.
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vides that summary to the respondents, who may review the docu-
ments on which the enforcement staff will rely.' 85 The NCAA
Committee on Infractions has recently suggested that the case sum-
mary be given earlier in the procedure to allow institutions more time
to conduct their own investigations.8 6 However, the NCAA will have
difficulty granting the same disclosure of facts as in a criminal pro-
ceeding because the NCAA lacks subpoena power and thus cannot
compel witnesses to appear.
Individuals in Florida are also entitled to the same rights of discov-
ery as those available in civil or criminal cases. 87 In an NCAA pro-
ceeding, the respondent may contact any individual upon whose
statement the NCAA staff will rely." 8 The respondent may also review
all documentary evidence to be relied upon by the staff. 8 9 If facts are
in dispute, further joint interviews are conducted. 19° The Lee Commit-
tee recommended that mandatory tape-recorded statements should be
discoverable, unless a protective order is granted by the hearing offi-
cer for good cause.' 9' By adopting the recommendation of the Lee
Committee, the NCAA could significantly improve its procedures;
however, uttil the NCAA is given the ability to compel discovery, its
procedures cannot assure the same degree of fairness provided by the
courts.
In Florida hearings must begin within twelve months of notice of
investigation to the institution.' 92 This twelve-month period is tolled
by any delay on the part of the institution or individual being investi-
gated, whether or not for good cause. 193 The period for commence-
ment extends to eighteen months if the institution reports its own
violation to the association. 94 Under current NCAA procedures, alle-
gations must be based upon violations occurring not more than four
years before the NCAA gives notice of preliminary inquiry. 95 How-
ever, this provides no time limit for the investigation once the NCAA
sends its notice of preliminary inquiry.' 96 The NCAA's only obligation
185. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 2.
186. Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(6) (1991).
188. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 2. Again, this does not guarantee that the individual
will provide any additional information or even stand behind previous statements.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 6. The Lee Committee described "good cause" as in-
formation which would be detrimental to the institution or jeopardize the investigation. Id.
192. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(9) (1991).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 2.
196. Id.
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is to notify the institution of the status of the investigation. '9 In addi-
tion, the NCAA cannot extend an investigation beyond one year with-
out approval by the Committee on Infractions and notice to the
institution. 191
Fortunately, the NCAA is in the process of adopting the Lee Com-
mittee's enhanced notice recommendation.'9 This would provide, in
the initial notice, to the institution information as to the nature of the
alleged violation and the part of the athletic program allegedly in-
volved. 200 The NCAA staff and chief executive of the involved institu-
tion would then discuss a timetable for resolution, as well as joint
investigative efforts.20' The Lee Committee also supported a "sum-
mary disposition" provision for efficient handling of major viola-
tions.202 The summary disposition would allow cases to be resolved
more quickly when the NCAA and the institution agree on the facts.
Essentially, the parties would negotiate a settlement and resolve the
case within three to four months. 203 The NCAA Committee on Infrac-
tions agreed with this recommendation and has moved toward imple-
menting it.2 4 Nonetheless, the Florida statute provides the only
definite limitation period.
Under the Florida statute, individual defendants, including employ-
ees and students, charged with misconduct must receive written notice
at least two months before the hearing on specific charges.0 5 The no-
tice must include the date and time of the hearing and specify the
charges and possible penalties and must also be delivered to the insti-
tution. 206 Current NCAA procedures do not specify an advance notice
provision, but the time of the hearing is set by agreement between the
Committee on Infractions and the institution.20 7 If the allegations po-
tentially affect individuals, the institution must inform the individuals
that they have the opportunity to submit information orally or in writ-
197. Id.
198. Id. Thus, one could imagine a situation in which the NCAA sent notice of preliminary
inquiry just before the four-year deadline. The investigation could consume another year before
the Committee on Infractions comes into play. This puts the alleged violation almost five years
removed from the proceeding. Moreover, with approval of the Committee on Infractions and
notice to the institution, the proceeding could linger even longer.
199. Id.
200. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 4.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 5.
204. Memorandum from D. Alan Williams, Chair, NCAA Committee on Infractions, to
Judith M. Sweet, President, NCAA (Jan. 8, 1992), at 2.
205. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(3) (1991).
206. Id.
207. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 3.
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ing. 208 The institution must also notify the individual of the right to
participate in the hearing with personal legal counsel.2 09 The advan-
tage of the Florida provision is that it specifies a minimum time pe-
riod for preparation. In addition, the Florida statute places more of
the notification burden on the NCAA.
Under the Florida law, the respondent has the right to a formal
hearing, in which civil rules of evidence will apply. 10 In traditional
NCAA proceedings the hearing takes place before the eight-member
Committee on Infractions."' Opening and closing arguments are al-
lowed, after which the enforcement staff presents information discov-
ered during the investigation. 212 Individual respondents participate in
portions of the hearing affecting them individually. 23 The Committee
may receive any oral or documentary evidence unless the information
is determined to be irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitious. 2 4 Informa-
tion from individuals unwilling to be identified is not presented. 1 5
The primary criticism of the NCAA system is the apparent lack of
separation between the enforcement staff and the Committee on In-
fractions.21 6 The Lee Committee suggested that the NCAA modify its
program to allow a hearing officer to resolve factual issues and rec-
ommend penalties. 2 7 The Committee believed that this recommenda-
tion would be most effective if judges, eminent legal authorities, or
other persons of stature were used in the adjudicative process. 218 This
recommendation was not intended to make the process more adversar-
ial, but to allow an independent person trained in weighing evidence
to review the information.1 9 However, the recommendation has not
yet been adopted and would require approval by the membership .220
The Florida statute further provides that the hearing will be open to
the public unless either a party charged with misconduct or the institu-
tion objects. 22' By contrast, current NCAA proceedings are not open,
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(1), (5) (1991).
211. Until the 1993 Convention, the Committee on Infractions consisted of six members.
PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 3. However, at the 1993 Convention the membership increased
this number to eight to allow the general public to serve. Convention Voting Summary, supra
note 30, at 14.
212. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 3.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 6.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
221. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(8) (1991).
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and each case is treated as confidential until completed. 222 The Lee
Committee disapproved of this practice and recommended that the
hearings be open to the greatest extent possible.223 Under the Lee pro-
posal-which has yet to be adopted in convention-the hearing officer
could still determine that some portions of the hearings should be kept
confidential in the interest of privacy, fact-finding, and justice. 24
Therefore, both the Lee recommendation and the Florida statute pro-
vide for open hearings, but differ in which party is allowed to deter-
mine that the hearing should be closed.
Although both the Florida statute and current NCAA practices al-
low respondents to be represented by counsel, they differ in the right
to interrogate witnesses. The Florida act provides this opportunity in
section 240.5341(4), whereas the NCAA, lacking subpoena power,
must provide other means. The enforcement staff must disclose all in-
dividuals and documents upon which it will rely.225 The respondent
may then interview the individuals or obtain affidavits or other infor-
mation from them. 226 At the hearing, information may be exchanged
between the parties, and the Committee on Infractions may question
any person present .227 The NCAA has recognized the need to make
information available earlier in the process. Thus, the Committee on
Infractions will recommend that access to information be permitted at
the time notice of official inquiry is sent.228 Earlier access to informa-
tion will undoubtedly benefit those involved in the process, but falls
short of allowing interrogation and cross-examination of witnesses.
The Florida statute229 and NCAA procedures are similar in provid-
ing the respondent an opportunity to present a complete defense. 2 0 In
addition, in Florida, respondents may suppress evidence resulting
from interrogations that abridge the rights of full disclosure and dis-
covery.2 1' The NCAA does not have a provision for suppression of
evidence, but the investigatory staff must follow certain procedures,
violation of which will keep the evidence from being considered. 232
222. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 4.
223. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 6. The Lee Committee was closely divided on this issue.
Id.
224. Id. at 6-7.
225. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 4.
226. Of course, there is no guarantee that the person will talk when approached. See supra
note 188-90 and accompanying text.
227. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 4.
228. Id.
229. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(4) (1991).
230. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 4. The NCAA allows respondents to present informa-
tion subject to rules of relevance, materiality, repetitiveness, and confidentiality of sources. Id.
231. FLA. STAT. § 240.5343(3) (1991).
232. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 4.
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The Lee Committee recommended that interviews with witnesses be
recorded in order for prehearing statements to be admissible. 233 Ac-
cording to the recommendation, the NCAA staff must also reveal the
existence of the tape no later than the date on which it issues official
notice of the charges.234 The witness may also appear at the hearing if
the witness' testimony will be used.2" Again, the Florida provision has
the advantage of clarifying the rights of individuals. The NCAA could
lessen this advantage by adopting the Lee Committee's recommenda-
tion.
The Florida statute would require the NCAA, at its own expense, to
provide a transcript prepared by a court reporter of the interroga-
tion. 236 The NCAA tape records the hearings, but does not prepare or
provide a transcript. The respondent may obtain this information by
receiving permission from the Committee on Infractions to listen to
the tape at NCAA offices and to take handwritten notes. 27 The Lee
Committee suggested that transcripts or tape recordings of the hear-
ings be sent to involved parties and institutions upon request and that
anyone be allowed to purchase a copy of the tape or transcript after
the conclusion of the case. 238 The Committee believed that the risk of
transcripts becoming available to the public during the proceeding is
outweighed by the interest in creating a cooperative spirit during the
process.29 The NCAA is in the process of adopting a modified version
of this recommendation, which should address the problem resolved
by the Florida statute.
In the weighing of evidence, the Florida statute provides that find-
ings made by an association must be supported by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 240 The NCAA's standard for weighing evidence is less
clear. NCAA findings must be based upon evidence which the Com-
mittee determines to be "credible, persuasive and of a kind on which
reasonably prudent persons rely in the conduct of serious affairs."' 41
As with other provisions, the advantage of the Florida statute is that it
creates a more precise standard on which a finding must be based.
The Florida statute also requires that penalties imposed by an asso-
ciation must be reasonable in light of the violation and must be com-
233. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 5. The recommendation contains a special provision for
using the "best evidence available" when taping is not possible. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. FLA. STAT. § 240.5343(2) (1991).
237. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 5.
238. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 7.
239. Id. at 7.
240. FLA. STAT. § 240.5341(2) (1991).
241. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 5.
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parable to penalties applied for previous similar violations.4 2 NCAA
bylaws provide for broad and severe penalties for institutions showing
a general disregard for NCAA rules.243 On the other hand, penalties
are specific and limited when the violations are isolated and insignifi-
cant. 2" The NCAA has further classified violations as "major" or
"secondary." Secondary violations include those which are inadver-
tent or provide only a limited recruiting or competitive advantage to
the institution. 245 The NCAA classifies all other violations as major,
specifically including repeat violations and those that give a substan-
tial advantage to the offender. 2"
The Lee Committee recognized the need for increased uniformity of
sanctions. Thus, the Committee recommended that the NCAA en-
hance its reporting to the public and the news media.17 The public
would then be aware of the reasons behind the actions taken. 2" Addi-
tionally, the Lee Committee suggested that the NCAA should make
available a compilation of past cases and the actions taken.24 9 This
would serve as a reference to institutions involved in the infractions
process. 20 The NCAA has decided to follow this recommendation and
to compile a book of past cases that will be made available for mem-
bers to review. 25' Once implemented, this method for reporting prece-
dents should appease those who claim that NCAA sanctions are
handed out in a random or biased manner. Again, by adopting the
recommendation of the Lee Committee, the NCAA is eliminating
some of the problems the Florida statute was designed to prevent.
A final difference between the new Florida act and current NCAA
procedure is the method of appeal. In Florida, any penalty imposed
on the institution or imposed on an individual by direction of the
NCAA is subject to review in the circuit courts. 252 In NCAA proceed-
ings, members formerly appealed to the NCAA Council .253 The lim-
ited usefulness of that appellate process is undoubtedly the impetus
behind the Florida provision. In all the years of NCAA infractions
242. FLA. STAT. § 240.5342(1), (2) (1991).
243. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 5.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 5-6.
246. Id.
247. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 8.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 5.
252. FLA. STAT. § 240.5342(3) (1991).
253. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 6. The NCAA changed this procedure at its 1993 Con-
vention. See supra note 30. The effectiveness of the new procedure in providing adequate review
remains to be seen.
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cases, the NCAA Council never overturned a decision on appeal. 2 -4
Thus, the NCAA Council rubber-stamped the decision of the Com-
mittee on Infractions under the pretense of appellate review. How-
ever, as with any private organization, an individual or institution has
the limited opportunity for judicial review if the respondent believes
the NCAA has not followed its own procedures or has violated the
respondent's legal rights. 2"1
The Lee Committee recommended a change in the NCAA's appel-
late process. 2 6 Its recommendation would work in conjunction with
the recommendation that hearing officers be used to determine factual
issues in each case. 2 7 The findings of the hearing officer could be ap-
pealed to the Committee on Infractions, which would have the power
to set aside "clearly erroneous" findings.5 8 The Committee on Infrac-
tions would also have the authority to determine the appropriate pen-
alty. 2 9 If this penalty is more severe than that recommended by the
hearing officer, a special review body could be asked to review the
increase.2 ° The special review body could either affirm the Committee
on Infractions' penalty or decrease it.261 The reorganization of the
NCAA appellate process will require approval by the Association's
membership.26 2 Further, this internal change will still not open the
court system to parties feeling short-changed by the NCAA's proceed-
ings. Thus, the NCAA proceedings, even as modified by the Lee
Committee, fall short of the review provided by the Florida statute.
The overall comparison of the Florida statute to current NCAA
proceedings shows that respondents in Florida would enjoy greater
rights and protections than those in a state without a due process re-
quirement. When the recommendations of the Lee Committee are
added to the comparison, the NCAA procedures compare more favor-
ably with the Florida law. Unfortunately, not all of these recommen-
dations have been adopted. Also, they may not prove as effective in
their application as they appear on paper. Nevertheless, they do re-
flect increasing organizational attention to the demands of due proc-
ess, an attention which continually pushes the NCAA's adjudicatory
processes more in line with due process norms.
254. See YAEOER, supra note 4, at 133; TEN THINGS, supra note 35, at 2.
255. PRorEcTIONS, supra note 171, at 6. However, the courts have not been responsive to
such claims against the NCAA. See supra notes 34-92 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 133.
257. Id.
258. PROTECTIONS, supra note 171, at 6.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. LEE REPORT, supra note 127, at 7.
262. PRoTEcTIONs, supra note 171, at 6.
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Although improvements in NCAA procedures may continue to
erode the need for Florida's law, this law, as well the provisions in
other states, has been instrumental in pushing the NCAA to change.
There may soon come a time when state laws are no longer needed.
This would be welcomed because it would indicate that the NCAA has
achieved significant reform.
B. NCAA Challenges State Laws in Court
While some states consider due process legislation and others have
already passed it, the NCAA has continued to declare that these laws
violate the United States Constitution. The NCAA believes these laws
represent an impermissible interference with the NCAA enforcement
program, which falls under interstate commerce. 61 In support of this
position, the NCAA cites Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sul-
livan,264 which indicates that states do not have the authority to regu-
late aspects of national commerce in which uniformity requires that
regulation come from a single source. 265 The NCAA also cites CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America266 to suggest that state statutes
creating inconsistent regulation of interstate commerce may be invali-
dated under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.267 Further, the NCAA suggests that the application of a state
statute to commerce taking place wholly outside the borders of the
state is unconstitutional, even if the commerce has effects within the
state.26 Applying this to its regulations, the NCAA contends that in-
consistent state rules would destroy its national enforcement pro-
gram. 269 According to the NCAA, local interference by state
legislatures should not be allowed because the NCAA enforcement
rules are voluntarily adopted. 70 The NCAA claims that state legisla-
tures are interfering with the function of rules promulgation, which is
reserved to a nationwide association of member schools; thus, the
NCAA claims that these laws are "in all likelihood unconstitu-
tional. ''271
263. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATmLETIC Ass'N, UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE "DUE PROC-
ESS" LAWS 1 (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter STATE LAWS].
264. 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
265. STATE LAWS, supra note 263 (citing Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767).
266. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
267. Article I, § 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce ... among the several States."
268. STATE LAWS, supra note 263 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
269. STATE LAWS, supra note 263.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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The NCAA acted quickly to challenge state due process legisla-
tion.71 The first opportunity came in Nevada during an investigation
of UNLV, where the Nevada due process law was challenged before
the NCAA proceeded with its investigation. The NCAA sought an or-
der enjoining the defendants, persons being investigated for possible
rules violations, from invoking the Nevada due process statute.273 The
NCAA offered several theories in support of its claim. First, it chal-
lenged the statute on Commerce Clause274 and Contracts Clause27
grounds. It also alleged a violation of the First Amendment right to
associate.2 76 Finally, the NCAA claimed that the Nevada statute con-
tained provisions that were vague or overbroad. 277
The defendants first suggested that the court should abstain from
addressing the constitutional issues and allow the case to be heard in a
state court.2 7 However, the court noted that abstention is an "ex-
traordinary and narrow exception to the duty" of a court to hear the
controversy before it.279 The court then rejected the abstention re-
quest, stating that the Nevada statute does not involve a "sensitive
area of social policy" and that a state court's construction of the stat-
ute would not eliminate the constitutional questions.2 80 The court then
reached the constitutional issues.
The court began with the Commerce Clause claim, noting that al-
though the clause is phrased as an affirmative grant of power to Con-
gress, courts have long construed the Commerce Clause as limiting the
ability of states to regulate interstate commerce.81 Thus, the initial
inquiry was whether the enforcement rules of the NCAA are properly
classified as interstate commerce. The court found that the NCAA's
national scope clearly represents interstate commerce,2 2 which led the
272. These actions have taken forms ranging from court challenge against Nevada's legisla-
tion to attempts to have other state laws repealed. Letter from Samuel P. Bell III, NCAA local
counsel, to Florida Senator Fred Dudley and Florida Representative James E. "Jim" King, Jr.
(Mar. 6, 1992).
273. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Nev. 1992)
(challenging NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 398.155-.255 (Michie 1991)). Not surprisingly, former
UNLV coach Jerry Tarkanian was one of the defendants. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1479.
274. See supra text accompanying note 263.
275. Article I, § 10, clause I of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
276. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging . the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
277. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1479.
278. Id. at 1481.
279. Id. (citing County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)).
280. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1481 (D. Nev 1992).
281. Id. at 1482.
282. Id. (citing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977)). The Hennessey court
stated that the management of intercollegiate athletics is "clearly business, and big business at
that." 564 F.2d at 1150.
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court to ask whether the statute violated the Commerce Clause. The
court found that the Nevada statute was not per se invalid because it
did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. 283 Thus, the
court had to balance the state's interest in the statute against the bur-
den on interstate commerce.
Although the court found that Nevada's interest in protecting the
careers, livelihoods, and reputations of its citizens was legitimate, it
concluded that the burden on the NCAA's uniform rules system out-
weighed this interest. 21 The court found that the statute had a sub-
stantial impact outside of Nevada. 85 Finally, the court considered the
interaction of the Nevada statute with other regulatory schemes and
the potential impact if many other states adopted similar statutes. The
court hinted that Congress could pass NCAA due process legisla-
tion, 286 but found that a web of state laws would destroy the NCAA's
uniform rules program.287 Thus, the court held that the Nevada statute
violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.28
The court next turned to the NCAA's claim that the Nevada statute
impairs contractual relations between the organization and member
schools in violation of the Contracts Clause. The court stated that the
clause is not to be read literally, but requires a balancing of the degree
of the impairment and the extent of the state's interest u 9 After the
initial finding that the NCAA and its member schools shared a con-
tractual relationship, the court discussed whether the statute's inter-
ference with the contract was substantial. The court agreed with the
NCAA's claim that it could not comply with some of the provisions
of the Nevada statute and thus would be precluded from investigating
Nevada schools. The court found this to be a substantial impairment
of the contract because it would give Nevada schools an unfair advan-
tage and frustrate the NCAA's objective of ensuring a level playing
field in intercollegiate athletics.290 Because the statute altered the rela-
tions between an arm of the state government (UNLV) and a private
party (the NCAA), rather than two private parties, the court stated
that the impairment of contract must be "necessary to achieve an im-
283. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1483.
284. Id. at 1484.
285. Id.
286. The court stated that "when Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented,
and there is significantly less danger that one State will be in a position to exploit others." Id. at
1485 n.4 (quoting South-Central Timber Dcv., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)).
287. Id. at 1485.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1487.
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portant public purpose. ' 29 The court found that the state did not
meet this burden because the statute was aimed directly at the NCAA
and was not designed to address a broad societal problem. 292 The
court suggested that the Nevada schools could work for reform within
the NCAA, or even seek congressional action. Nevertheless, the court
held that the state could not interfere with the contractual relationship
between the NCAA and its members. 93
Having found sufficient grounds to resolve the case, the court did
not discuss the First Amendment right to associate or the NCAA's
claim that the Nevada statute was vague and overbroad. Because the
court found the provisions of the statute invalid and unenforceable,
the court enjoined the defendants from seeking protection under the
Nevada due process statute. 294
The matter is not final, however, because the defendants filed a no-
tice of appeal in the circuit court soon after the initial ruling. 295 The
NCAA has stated from the beginning of the Nevada case that the mat-
ter very likely must be resolved by the United States Supreme Court. 296
Although the NCAA could proceed with its investigation of UNLV
after the favorable ruling, the NCAA has stated that it will wait until
all appeals are .exhausted before resuming the investigation. 297
Although the Nevada case has no direct effect on the due process
laws in other states, including Florida's new law, 291 the case serves as a
precedent for suits in the other states. The strength of this precedent
in Florida could have been resolved in a case in which a University of
Florida athlete sued the NCAA to have a year of eligibility restored. 299
Gator football player Monty Grow alleged that the NCAA violated
291. Id. (citing State of Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.
1990)).
292. Id. at 1488.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Jurisprudence, L.A. TmEs, June 24, 1992, at C2.
296. Danny Robbins, Court Voids Nevada Law, L.A. TrMES, June 6, 1992, at Cl.
297. Id.
298. However, the decision may cause other states to postpone consideration of similar bills.
299. Gator football player Monty Grow filed suit on September 25, 1992, seeking to gain
another year of eligibility. Grow missed one season for use of a substance banned by the NCAA.
Never having taken a redshirt season, one in which the athlete does not participate in games and
does not lose a year of eligibility, Grow maintains that the year of suspension should count as a
redshirt year. Florida Linebacker Sues NCAA, Cm. Tam., Oct. 8, 1992, at C2.
The court could have chosen to ignore the Nevada precedent based upon a fundamental fac-
tual distinction. The Nevada case involved an NCAA investigation of a member institution and
related individuals. However, Grow's case related only to his individual eligibility and did not
involve the University of Florida. Deciding that the federal courts could not quickly resolve the
issue, Grow dismissed his suit against the NCAA and opted to sue the University and Board of
Regents in state court. Briefs: College Football, TAL.AHAsSEE DEMOCRAT, Mar. 17, 1993, at C2.
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his right to due process and failed to comply with Florida's new stat-
ute.3 0 In its motion for summary judgment, the NCAA asserted that
Grow's due process claim was without merit because "[tihe NCAA is
not engaged in state action . . . despite the declaration [of Florida
law] to the contrary." 0' The NCAA further claimed that Florida's
due process statute was unconstitutional under both the United States
Constitution and the Florida Constitution.3O2 Despite the NCAA's
contentions, the Florida law remains in effect until someone else uses
it to challenge NCAA action.
A case challenging Florida's law on that of another state need not
find that the state due process statute is unconstitutional merely be-
cause the Nevada case so found. Illinois, for example, believes that its
statute would stand a better chance of being upheld than the Nevada
lawA03 Proponents of the Illinois law point out that the adversarial
impact might not be as great with Tarkanian not involved. 3°4 Further,
the Illinois legislation is more specific than the Nevada law.3 °5 This
could be good news for the Florida law, as it too is more specific than
the Nevada law. In fact, the NCAA lists the Florida and Illinois laws
as similar in its comparison of the current and pending state due proc-
ess laws.
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Meanwhile, the Nevada case will work its way toward the U.S. Su-
preme Court. Until then, Florida's law will only be removed if legisla-
tors are impressed enough with NCAA internal reform actions to
repeal it.
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306. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, NCAA STATE LEGISLATION DUE PROCESS COM-
PARISON (n.d.). Like Florida's law, the Illinois law allows the accused to confront and examine
witnesses, applies rules of evidence normally found in trials, and has provisions for the suppres-
sion of evidence. The Illinois law also requires that penalties bear a reasonable relationship to
the violation and are subject to judicial review. In contrast, the Nevada statute is less specific
when defining the rights of the accused to confront witnesses and the evidentiary standard. The
Nevada statute also is not as detailed in establishing notice and hearing requirements.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Florida has taken the initiative by joining three other states in man-
dating due process in NCAA proceedings. These states have been
prompted to act because Congress has not shown enough concern
with the actions of the NCAA to pass federal legislation. The court
system also has not provided relief to member institutions and athletes
feeling slighted by the system. State legislatures finally broke the trend
of inaction by individually passing laws forcing the NCAA to incorpo-
rate greater due process protections into existing procedures. Al-
though the NCAA has successfully challenged the Nevada law, the
significance of such laws cannot be overlooked. By taking the lead,
Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada have shown the NCAA that it
must continually update its due process protections. The NCAA has
responded to the public pressure by enhancing its investigative proce-
dures at recent conventions. Even if these state laws are eventually
removed from the books, their influence will still be apparent because
they send a message that the NCAA must continue to develop better
enforcement procedures.
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